Managing relational bond: An integrative approach by Hwang, P.
Managing Relational Bond: An Integrative Approach
Author(s): Peter Hwang
Source: The Journal of Business, Vol. 78, No. 2 (March 2005), pp. 557-576
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/427638 .
Accessed: 27/09/2015 21:27
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Journal of Business.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded from 137.132.123.69 on Sun, 27 Sep 2015 21:27:55 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
#04463 UCP: BN article # 780206
Peter Hwang
National University of Singapore
Managing Relational Bond: An
Integrative Approach*
According to transaction cost theory, an inherent
benefit of an organizational hierarchy is the ability
to administer incentives that reduce the payoff
from opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1975).
Research on self-enforcing agreements (Telser
1980; Dyer and Singh 1998), however, suggests
that similar effects can be achieved in relation-
ships among independent firms. Studies on the
cotton and diamond industries found that these
industries have almost entirely opted out of the
public legal system, replacing it with a complex
system of private commercial law (Bernstein
1992, 2001). For example, the diamond industry
resolves disputes through an elaborate, internal set
of rules developed by the sophisticated traders
who dominate the industry. This system of private
governance competes well with distinctive insti-
tutions and sanctions.
A key to the success of any self-enforcing
agreement is the alignment of self-interests by
creating an incentive structure that sustains coop-
eration (Wathne and Heide 2000). It is elementary
that there is no incentive to cooperate if joint work
yields less reward than individual efforts (Axelrod
1984; Oye 1986; Parkhe 1993). A relationship
is also unlikely to last if ‘‘lucrative’’ opportunis-
tic gains or ‘‘intolerable’’ losses emerge Axelrod
1984; Dawes et al. 1986; Rapoport and Eshed-
Levy 1989; Parkhe 1993). Effective management
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focus on managing the
pattern of payoff to
enhance a relationship.
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of payoff outcomes, which fundamentally affects prospects for the
emergence and maintenance of cooperation, begets the question: Which
payoff outcome has the strongest effect in motivating cooperation?
We develop a contingency framework to address this important
question by integrating two streams of literature. The first literature dis-
cusses how changes in payoff outcomes affect cooperation through the
parameters of fear, greed, and benefit (e.g., Rapoport and Chammah
1965; Coombs 1973; Poppe and Utens 1986; Rapoport and Eshed-Levy
1989; Schmidt et al. 2001). The development of this literature is closely
associated with various cooperation indices that have been proposed over
time.1 The second literature addresses how changes in interpersonal and
intertemporal dynamics influence cooperation through the intensity of
the temptation to defect and apprehension of being cheated (e.g., Axelrod
1984; Kreps 1990; Heide andMiner 1992; Parkhe 1993; Uzzi 1996; Dyer
and Singh 1998; Hwang and Burgers 1999). While the former focuses
on the structuring of payoff outcomes, the latter stresses the contextual
background of the relationship in which the payoffs are embedded. This
paper integrates these two streams of literature by suggesting that the
effectiveness of payoff management hinges systematically on the con-
text of a relationship.
This paper posits that interpersonal and intertemporal dynamics jointly
shape four distinct relational contexts, which depict varying degrees of
relativity between temptation and apprehension. Each relational context
corresponds to a unique sequence of the relative influences of payoff
outcomes on cooperation. We show that the incentive effects of payoffs
are highly sensitive to a specific relational context. Altogether, four
sequences corresponding to four relational contexts are derived. These
sequences exhibit an internally symmetric pattern from which the con-
notations of the underlying relational contexts can be inferred.
Our research has important managerial implications for building
stronger collaborative relationships. Networks built on interorganiza-
tional relationships have been acknowledged as an important source
of core competence (Barringer and Harrison 2000; Gulati, Nohria,
and Zaheer 2000), and the importance of interfirm cooperation in in-
dustrial clusters or regional groups is widely recognized (Porter 1998).
Within organizations, sharing and conveying necessary information are
critical to the performance of knowledge-based activities involving
cross-functional teams (Mitchell 1999). Our research provides guiding
principles for managers to structure interactive outcomes in line with the
contextual background of a relationship.
In the paper, interpersonal dynamics refers to the level of trust as
manifested in the strength of personal ties (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi
1. See Murnighan and Roth (1983) for a comprehensive review on the early development
of these indices.
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1996), while intertemporal dynamics refers to the expected continuity,
or time horizon, of an exchange (Axelrod 1984; Kreps 1990). We first
review the literature on the time horizon and trust, followed by a dis-
cussion of the relationship between payoff structure and cooperation
incentives. We then present a contingency framework for payoff man-
agement that analyzes the impact of payoff outcomes on cooperation.
Discussion and conclusions follow.
I. Time Horizon, Trust, Payoffs, and Cooperative Incentives
Economic behavior does not occur in a vacuum but is necessarily em-
bedded in social and temporal contexts. The impact of intertemporal
dynamics on cooperation has been extensively studied in economics
(e.g., Kreps et al. 1982; Kreps 1990). It is widely accepted that, when the
likelihood of future interactions is high, opportunism is constrained
because the temporary benefits from cheating today are outweighed by
retaliatory punishments delivered in the future (Telser 1980; Axelrod
1984; Kreps 1990). In the same vein, that victims have greater power
delivering punishments in an extended time horizon suggests that the
concern over defection should be lower (Telser 1980; Axelrod 1984;
Kreps 1990). Ample empirical studies indicate that the expectation of a
continuing interaction is an important determinant of cooperation (e.g.,
Heide and Miner 1992; Pahkhe 1993).
A growing body of literature suggests that, in addition to intertemporal
dynamics, interpersonal dynamics influence a wide range of significant
economic phenomena. Trust has emerged as the new ‘‘missing factor’’
that explains why some countries or regions develop rapidly and others
lag behind (Knack and Keefer 1997; Humphrey and Schimtz 1998; Zak
and Knack 2001). Fukuyama (1995) suggests that the lack of trust, and
thus the diminished role of incomplete contracts, has been a cause of
slow economic development in some societies. At the industry level,
trust-based relations also are seen as part of the competitive advantages of
manufacturing enterprises in Germany, Japan, and parts of Italy during
the 1970s and 1980s (Putnam 1993; Lane andBachmann 1996; Sako and
Helper 1998). Trust is important because it eases one’s concern of being
cheated (e.g., Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995; La Porta et al.1997). Trust
also contains opportunistic behavior, because a relationship maintained
with a trustworthy partner is more secure and hence more valuable. Put
differently, the cost of opportunism is high if it leads to the termination
of a trustworthy relationship (Hwang and Burgers 1997).
Researchers across disciplines have long been searching for the
link between payoffs and cooperation incentives (e.g., Rapoport and
Chammah 1965; Steele and Tedeschi 1967; Harris 1969; Roth and
Murnighan 1978; Murnighan and Roth 1983 for a comprehensive re-
view). In a two-party exchange, the payoff outcomes are denoted T,R, P,
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and S, respectively. T denotes the temptation payoff to the player who
cheats while his or her partner cooperates, R is the reward for mutual
cooperation, P is the punishment for mutual defection, and S is the
sucker’s payoff to the player who cooperates while his or her partner
does not. The indices of cooperation developed in previous research
generally fall into three broad categories as summarized in table 1.
The first category consists of indices formed solely on the basis of the
payoff matrix. Rapoport and Chammah (1965) developed two indices,
r1 and r2.
2 While both indices suggest that an increase in R or a decrease
in Twould strengthen the motivation for cooperation, r2 ignores T and
places more emphasis on the value of S. Steele and Tedeschi (1967) and
Jones et al. (1968) supported the predictions of r1 and showed that
different payoff matrices markedly affect the rates of cooperative
choices. Two further indices, r3 and r4, were proposed by Harris (1969),
the former placing more emphasis on the losses arising from being
cheated and the latter on the immediate gains from cheating. The de-
nominator of all these indices shares a commonality in that it represents
the difference between the highest and the lowest payoff outcome.
Thibaut and Kelley (1959) proposed another four indices based on the
payoff values: k1 represents the control one has over his or her own
outcomes, k2 is the fate control one has over the other, k3 is the behavior
control of one over the other, and k4 is the overall level of outcomes
available. Empirical support has been found for Thibaut and Kelley’s
indices but not strongly for Harris’s (Wyer 1969).
2. The index r1 is better known as the k-index of cooperation, the underlying rationale of
which was fully explored in Rapoport (1967), where the symbol Kwas used. Interpreted as an
estimate of the rate of cooperation, r1 or K ranges from zero to one. One would expect the
cooperation rate to be about half of the timewhen r1 assumes the value of 0.5. Komorita (1976)
proposed an index K’ that extended r1 into the N-person case and showed that the predictions
of the model are consistent with not only the empirical results of two-person and N-person
games but also with the derivations of other normative models of the N-person case.
TABLE 1 Summary of the Cooperation Indices
r1 = (R  P )/(T  S )
r2 = (R  S )(T  S )
r3 = (P  S )/(T  S )
r4 = (T  R)/(i  S )
k1 = R + S  T  P
k2 = R  S + T  i
k3 = R  S  T + P
i4 = R + S + T + P
p1 (T  R)/(R  P )
p2 (T  R)/(R  S )
g ¼ 1
1d R T þ dðT  PÞ½ 
d  QðT RÞþð1QÞþðPSÞ
Q 2ðTPÞ
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The second category consists of indices based not only on payoff
values but also on the expected probability of the continuation of the
interaction, that is, the time horizon. Two such indices, P1 and P2, were
developed by Roth and Murnighan (1978), which are referred to as
equilibrium indices, as they determine at what point in any particular
exchange the cooperative choice is in equilibrium. Unlike the indices
for cooperation proposed by Rapoport and Chammah (1965), the equi-
librium indices may be interpreted as a measure of the difficulty in
achieving cooperative equilibrium. Specifically, P1 and P2 determine
the critical level of the probability of the continuation of the interaction,
below which no equilibria of cooperation could be attained. Roth and
Murnighan (1978) presented data that support the predictions of both
indices. Murnighan and Roth (1983) developed another index, g, based
on expected payoffs that can be obtained (or lost) from cooperation. The
letter d denotes the probability that the game will continue. Murnighan
and Roth (1983) found that g was more closely correlated with coop-
erative choices than indices developed under previous models.
Hwang and Burgers (1997) proposed a cooperation/noncooperation
index d based on the overall weighting of risks and rewards in a rela-
tionship. This index falls into a third category, because it depends not
only on payoff values but also on both the time horizon and trust. The
time horizon and trust are denoted d and Q, respectively, in table 1. The
conceptual basis for this index lies in the interplay of three incentives,
two discouraging and the other encouraging cooperation. In payoff
terms, the two incentives against cooperation are denoted TR and P
S in the numerator of the index, where T  R can be interpreted as the
amount of greed and P  S as the amount of fear (Rapoport 1967;
Coombs 1973; Poppe and Utens 1986; Rapoport and Eshed-Levy 1989;
Hwang and Burgers 1997). The payoff difference T  P in the de-
nominator can be decomposed into T R and R P, representing greed
and benefit, respectively. If T  R is held constant, a greater payoff
difference between T and P translates into greater R  P, suggesting
greater incentive to cooperate (Hwang and Burgers 1999).
II. A Contingency Framework for Payoff Management
In a two-party prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game, mutual cooperation must
yield a greater payoff than mutual noncooperation for cooperation to be
feasible. However, one has the option to cheat unilaterally to reap im-
mediate gains while facing the risk of being cheated by the other party.
We model party A’s payoff pattern in an interaction with party B as
T, R, P, and S, where T >R>P> S and no binding agreements are
allowed between players. In addition, party A’s anticipated time horizon
influences his or her propensity to cooperate. We assume that the PD is
repeated infinitely, t ¼ 1; 2; . . . , with all future payoffs discounted by
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the parameter d, the time horizon factor. The term d essentially com-
prises two distinct components: the probability of the continuation of
future interaction and the extent to which the value of future payoffs is
discounted (Garvey 1995). A greater likelihood of the continuation of
the game offsets a lower discount rate and vice versa: A higher discount
rate is functionally equivalent to a greater certainty of the future.
A’s estimate of the probability of cooperation byB is defined as trust and
denoted Q. That trust refers to beliefs about the likely behavior of others
who matter to the trustor’s decision making is generally agreed on among
trust researchers (e.g., Gambetta 1988; Burt and Knez 1996; Rousseau
et al. 1998; Kramer 1999). Gambetta (1988, p. 217) maintains that trust
is ‘‘the probability that one economic actor will make decisions and
take actions that will be beneficial or at least not detrimental to another.’’
Burt and Knez (1996) define trust simply as ‘‘anticipated cooperation.’’
La Porta et al. (1997) define trust as a propensity for people to cooperate.
Sako and Helper (1998) maintain that trust is an expectation held by an
agent that its trading partnerswill behave in amutually acceptablemanner.
Our position is that one may be willing to place a certain level of trust
on a partner (or partners) while each individual is still self-interested and
tries tomaximize his or her own payoff (Barney andHansen 1994; Chen
2000). The basis of trust could be due to social capital, moral consid-
eration, psychological cost, the ability of a group to discipline individual
behavior, or simply a preference for being honest (Putnam 1993;Wicks,
Berman, and Jones 1999; Chen 2000; Bohnet, Frey, and Huck 2001).3
It is important to note that A faces two risks in respect of trust-based
decisions: the risk of trust manipulation and the risk of trust abuse. Trust
manipulation occurs when the other party is deemed more trustworthy
due to previous cooperation but the truemotive behind such cooperation
had been to solicit more trust before defecting. This ill-intentioned
motive exists because more trust, all else being equal, begets greater
willingness to be exposed (e.g., Gambetta 1988; Kramer 1999).Without
certain indications that cooperation is genuine, upgrading trust after
cooperation could result in one’s trust being manipulated. Likewise,
trust abuse may occur if one continues to cooperate after the other’s
defection. Note that, while a defection could be due to misperception or
mistake, it may very well be truly intended (Kreps 1990, p. 523: see also
Sitkin and Roth 1993, p. 371). Without further evidence suggesting that
the defection is due to misperception or mistake, cooperation after de-
fection could result in one’s trust being abused.
3. Trust reflects the incomplete information that A has about B’s payoffs, motivation or
behavior. Kreps et al. (1982) have shown that information asymmetries can generate coop-
erative behavior in finitely repeated versions of the classic prisoners’ dilemma. In practice,
decision makers generally lack complete information about other parties. It is not uncommon
for parties to engage in business transactions based on ‘‘words’’ or ‘‘handshakes.’’ While A’s
trust in B depends on his or her assessment, the grounds on which such assessment is based go
beyond the scope of this research.
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This paper takes a normative stance that circumvents trust violations
by controlling trust manipulation and abuse. This need not contradict
with the reality that trust violations do sometimes occur, noting that we
prescribe how a decision should be made rather than how a decision is
made.
Remarking on ‘‘human nature as we know it,’’ Williamson (1981)
maintained that, while organizational man is computationally less com-
petent than economic man, he or she is motivationally more complex.
Williamson (1981, p. 554) differentiated between ‘‘self-interest seek-
ing’’ and ‘‘self-interest seeking with guile.’’ That is, economic inter-
actions are greatly complicated by agents who make ‘‘false or empty,
that is, self-disbelieved threats or promises’’ (Goffman 1969, p. 105),
cut corners for undisclosed personal advantages, cover up tracks, and
the like. In a similar vein, Granovetter (1985, p. 491) stated, ‘‘The trust
engendered by personal relations presents, by its very existence, en-
hanced opportunity for malfeasance.’’ The risk of beingmisled is rooted
in the construct of social embeddedness, as fraud is considered an in-
trinsic part of self-interest (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1996).
Consistent with the premise of self-interest seeking with guile, our
model takes into consideration that (a) party B may try to solicit more
trust from party A by purposefully cooperating and (b) party B may
abuse party A’s trust. Party A therefore takes precautions against such
trust violations. It is plausible to argue that hardly anyone would like his
or her trust to be manipulated or abused ex ante. This is especially so if
the decision is of greater consequences with high stakes involved.
Given the payoff structure, the time horizon (d), and trust (Q), party A
should compare the expected present value of cooperation with that
of noncooperation to decide whether to cooperate. The following dis-
cussions of the model simulate party A’s decision-making processes at
t = 0, in which he or she plays out the possible scenarios of interactions
with party B in the future. In this thought experiment, party A calculates
the expected present values of alternative actions, viz., cooperation or
noncooperation, while controlling, hence precluding, the risk of trust
manipulation and trust abuse.4
We first calculate the present value of party A’s payoff if he or she
chooses to cooperate. The expected present value of party A’s payoff









4. The environment party A faces is that, in Williamson’s sense, of exchange partners who
are not only self-interested but could be so with guile. The model aims at understanding
payoff management and its relational context but does not seek to establish an equilibrium
condition of interaction.
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Note that cooperation ends at t ¼ 1 upon party B’s noncooperation.
This is to avoid trust abuse, as discussed, because party A cannot tell at
t ¼ 0 whether noncooperation is truly intended or otherwise.5
We then consider the scenario where the two parties cooperate at
t ¼ 0 and party A continues to cooperate while party B defects at t ¼ 1.
The expected present value of this scenario is
ð1 QÞQðRþ dS þ
X1
t¼2
Pt  dtÞ: ð2Þ
To avoid trust manipulation, party A holds the level of trust in party B
unchanged at t = 1 despite party B’s cooperation at t = 0.6 This is because
party A cannot judge whether party B’s cooperation is genuine or other-
wise at t ¼ 0. As in the previous scenario, cooperation again comes to a
halt at t ¼ 2 after party B’s defection at t ¼ 1.
Next is the scenario that the two parties cooperate at t ¼ 0 and t ¼ 1
and party A continues to cooperate but party B does not at t ¼ 2. The
expected present value of this scenario is
ð1 QÞQ2ðRþ dRþ d2S þ
X1
t¼3
Pt  dtÞ: ð3Þ
The arguments against trust manipulation and abuse lying behind
eq. (2) apply equally here. The three payoff outcomes relevant to party
A’s decision to cooperate while party B defects in the first period, the
second, the third, and so on, ad infinitum, are S, P, and R.
The expected present value of in all scenarios is
S ð1 QÞð1þ dQþ d2Q2 þ d3Q3 þ . . .Þ ¼ S ð1 QÞ=ð1 dQÞ½ : ð4Þ
The expected present value of P in all scenarios is
P dð1 QÞ=ð1 dÞ½ ð1þ dQþ d2Q2 þ d3Q3 þ . . .Þ
¼ P d=ð1 dÞ½  ð1 QÞ=ð1 dQÞ½ : ð5Þ
5. We do not preclude, however, that party Awill cooperate with party B again in another
encounter. Party Awill revaluate all the relevant parameters including payoff outcomes, trust,
and the time horizon should the occasion for another decision arise. In that encounter, party A
will go through the same decision-making process as described here to avoid trust abuse.
6. We do not claim that upgrading trust is erroneous but merely point out that party A acts in
accordance with the principle of avoiding trust manipulation in this thought experiment. In
fact, party A may increase the trust in party B in the next encounter if he or she believes that
party B’s cooperation is genuine in this encounter. Whatever the level of trust party A may
deem fit in the next encounter will stay unchanged in his or her decision-making process of that
encounter to avoid trust manipulation.
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The expected present value of R in all scenarios is
R ð1 QÞ=ð1 dÞ½  Qð1 dÞ þ Q2ð1 d2Þ þ Q3ð1 d3Þ þ . . . 
¼ R Q=ð1 QÞ½  ð1 QÞ=ð1 dQÞ½  ð6Þ
The sum of eqq. (4), (5), and (6) with respect to the present value of
payoff outcomes of party A’s decision to cooperate can be rearranged
and yields









Alternatively, party A may consider noncooperation as an option.
Noncooperation by party A at t ¼ 0 results in a payoff of either Twith a
probability of Q or P with a probability of 1  Q. In avoiding trust
abuse, party B ceases to cooperate after party A defects. The sum of the
expected present values (EPVs) of party A’Q payoffs under the non-
cooperative strategy is
EPVðAÞNt¼0 ¼ QT þ ð1 QÞP þ
X1
t¼1
Pt  dt: ð8Þ
Equation (8) can be rewritten as
EPVðAÞNt¼0 ¼ QT þ P
1 d ð1 Qþ dQÞ: ð9Þ
Party A is indifferent between cooperation and noncooperation when
EPVðAÞCt¼0 is equal to EPV(A)Nt¼0. Equating eqq. (7) and (9) and re-
arranging terms yield
R P ¼ 1 dQ
dQ
ðT  RÞ þ 1 Q
dQ2
ðP  SÞ: ð10Þ
Party A chooses to cooperate (not cooperate) if the left-hand side is
greater ( less) than the right-hand side in eq. (10).7 Rearranging terms,





T  1 Qð1 dQÞ
dQ2
P þ 1 Q
dQ2
S ¼ 0: ð11Þ
7. While B’s decision is not modeled, in A’s calculation, B follows the same decision-
making process as encapsulated inQ, which, in turn, capturesB’s assessment ofA ad infinitum.
565Managing Relational Bond
This content downloaded from 137.132.123.69 on Sun, 27 Sep 2015 21:27:55 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
#04463 UCP: BN article # 780206
In eq. (11), the payoff outcomes are weighted by trust (Q) and the
time horizon (d). With the weightings for R, T, P, and S denotedWR,WT ,
WP, and WS respectively, eq. (11) can be expressed as
WRRWTT WPP þWSS ¼ 0: ð12Þ
Note thatWR,WT ,WP, andWS take on nonnegative values, as both Q
and d range between zero and one. The partial derivatives of eq. (12)
with respect to function F are BF/BR > 0, BF/BT< 0, BF/BP< 0, and
BF/BS > 0. The signs of these partial derivatives are consistent with the
intuitive meaning of cooperativeness (Rapoport and Chammah 1965;
Roth and Murnighan 1978). They can be interpreted in the context of
benefit (RP ), greed (TR) and fear (P S ) (Rapoport and Chammah
1965; Hwang and Burgers 1999).8 Specifically, an increase in R not only
decreases greed but also increases benefit, an increase in P not only in-
creases fear but also decreases benefit, an increase in T increases greed,
and an increase in S decreases fear.
Note thatWS represents apprehension (abbreviatedAP) as it shapes fear
while WT denotes temptation (abbreviated TP) as it influences greed
(Hwang andBurgers 1999).9 BothWS andWT are inversely related to trust
and the time horizon, suggesting that more trust or a longer time horizon
not only contain opportunistic behavior but also mitigate concerns over
being victimized. Moreover, sinceWR ¼ WT þ 1 andWP ¼ WS þ 1,WR
and WP are also inversely related to trust and the time horizon.
The rule of combination suggests that six pairs10 of comparisons can
be obtained from the four coefficientsWR,WT ,WP, andW >S .
11 Two of
these are deterministic, that is, WR > WT and WP > WS , since WR ¼
WT þ 1 and WP ¼ WS þ 1. Conceptually, WR carries more weight than
WT because a change in T affects only greed while a change in R affects
not only greed but also benefit. Likewise, WP should have greater in-
fluence thanWS because a change in S affects only fear while a change in
P affects both fear and benefit.
The other four pair comparisons are nondeterministic. It is apparent
that, if WS > WT , thenWP > WR and vice versa. Simple algebra shows
8. See also Schmidt et al. (2001) for an empirical examination of the correlation between
rates of cooperation and variations of these parameters.
9. Temptation (TP), different from the temptation payoff (T ), denotes the propensity to act
opportunistically for the sake of short-term gain. Our notion of temptation (TP) is in line with
Friedman (1971, pp. 1, 7), who argues that, while threats are out of place in noncooperative
supergames because they are not credible, temptation is analogous to threat in that a player
may be tempted to increase his or her profit for a single period.
10. The six pairs are: WRand WT, WP and WS, WR and WP, WT and WS, WR and WS, and
WT and WP.
11. While the coefficients derived in eq. (11) may seem arbitrary, in that the equality holds
with the multiplication of a common factor, the raking orders of the pair comparisons dis-
cussed here, however, are altered by the application of a common factor.
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that WT must be greater than WS and WR greater than WP if d <
ð2Q 1Þ=Q2 and vice versa. Since the value of ð2Q 1Þ=Q2 is nega-
tive if trust level is less than 0.5, the necessary condition for WT > WS
andWR > WP is that Q is greater than 0.5, noting that d is not negative.
It follows that WT < WS and WR < WP when trust is less than 0.5 or
greater than 0.5 but d > ð2Q 1Þ=Q2. Under the conditions of WT <
WS and WR < WP, a marginal increase in S, resulting in a marginal
reduction in fear, promotes cooperation more effectively than a mar-
ginal decrease in T, leading to a marginal reduction in greed. By the
same token, a marginal decrease in P, giving rise to a marginal reduction
in fear and a marginal increase in benefit, is more effective in promoting
cooperation than a marginal increase in R, leading to a marginal re-
duction in greed and a marginal increase in benefit.
The ranking order of WS and WR can be determined by trust level
alone through simple algebra. Specifically, when trust is less (greater)
than the midpoint (=0.5), irrespective of the time horizon,WS is greater
( less) thanWR. When one’s trust in the other party is below midpoint, a
marginal increase in S, resulting in a marginal reduction in fear, is more
effective in promoting cooperation than a marginal increase in R, giving
rise to a marginal reduction in greed and a marginal increase in benefit.
Last, WT > WP when d < ð2Q 1Þ=2Q2 and vice versa. WT is
greater thanWP only if Q is above midpoint (=0.5) because the value of
ð2Q 1Þ=2Q2 becomes negative ifQ is less than 0.5, noting that d is not
negative. When Q is greater than 0.5 and d is short of ð2Q 1Þ=2Q2, a
marginal decrease in T, resulting in a marginal reduction in greed,
promotes cooperation more effectively than a marginal decrease in P,
leading to a marginal reduction in fear and a marginal increase in
benefit.
Four ranking sequences of payoff weightings can be derived from the
six pairs of comparisons as follows:
1. WP > WS > WR > WTwhen trust is less than 0.5.
2. WP > WR > WS > WT when trust is greater than 0.5 and d >ð2Q 1Þ=Q2.
3. WR>WP>WT>WS when trust is greater than 0.5 and ð2Q 1Þ=Q2 >
d > ð2Q 1Þ=2Q2.
4. WR > WT > WP > WS when trust is greater than 0.5 and d <ð2Q 1Þ=2Q2.
The first two ranking sequences have in common that the absolute
intensity of apprehension is greater than that of temptation (WS > WT).
However, the relative intensity of apprehension compared to tempta-
tion of these two sequences differs: The first sequence is greater than
the second. The first sequence suggests that fear alleviation (through
the operation of S ) not only has a greater effect on cooperation than
greed containment (through the operation of T ) but also a greater effect
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than greed containment and benefit enhancement (through the opera-
tion of R) combined. The second sequence suggests that fear alleviation
has agreater effect than greed containment but a lesser impact than
combining greed containment and benefit enhancement. As such, the
first sequence represents a case of apprehension in its strong form while
the second characterizes apprehension in its weak form.
The second two sequences also share the same attribute in that temp-
tation outranks apprehension (WT > WS) in the absolute term. Again,
these two sequences differ with respect to the relative intensity of ap-
prehension over temptation. The third sequence suggests a case of weak
form temptation because greed containment (through the operation
of T ) has a greater effect than fear alleviation (through the operation of
S ) but less effect than fear alleviation and benefit enhancement com-
bined. Symmetrically, the fourth sequence denotes a case of strong form
temptation because greed containment (through the operation of T ) has
a greater effect than not just fear alleviation but also fear alleviation and
benefit enhancement combined.
In aggregate, strong and weak form apprehension/temptation depict
alternative relational contexts with an internally symmetric structure as
follows.
First, two ranking sequences of payoff weightings emerge when
AP> TP and two when TP>AP.
Second, when AP > TP, the payoff outcomes under A’s noncoop-
eration strategy (P or T ) has the greatest and the least marginal impact
on cooperation, with P always outranking T. Symmetrically, when
TP>AP, the payoff outcomes under A’s noncooperation strategy (R or
S) has the greatest and the least marginal impact on cooperation, with R
outranking S at all times.
Third, when AP > TP, the marginal impact of the payoff outcomes
under A’s cooperation strategy (R or S ) on cooperation ranks in either
the second or the third place, with S outranking R under a strong-form
apprehension and reversely under a weak-form apprehension. Sym-
metrically, when TP>AP, the marginal impact of the payoff outcomes
under A’s noncooperation strategy (T or P) would also rank either sec-
ond or third, with T outranking P under strong form temptation and
reversely under weak form temptation. Figure 1 depicts the ranking of
the cooperative impact of payoff outcomes. Figure 2 maps the relativity
of temptation over apprehension on a two-dimensional space consti-
tuted by trust and the time horizon.
Figure 2 shows that, when trust is below the midpoint ð¼0:5Þ,
strong-form apprehension prevails regardless of the time horizon. Note
that, when trust is at the midpoint, one is on the borderline between
strong- and weak-form apprehension, suggesting that temptation can
surpass apprehension only when trust exceeds the midpoint. When
trust goes beyond the midpoint, the duration of the time horizon
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becomes critical in determining which of the other three sequences of
payoff weightings prevails. When the time horizon shortens, temptation
gradually intensifies relative to apprehension as the relational context
changes fromweak-form apprehension to weak-form temptation then to
strong-form temptation. As depicted in figure 2, our analysis suggests
different reasons for defection under varying relational contexts. For
example, defection may occur due to acute temptation in the context of
a short time horizon even with a very high trust level.
The natural break at the midpoint12 along both dimensions leads to
the following propositions:
Proposition 1. Trust less than 0.5, regardless of the time horizon, is ne-
cessary and sufficient for the predominance of strong-form apprehension.
Fig. 1.—Sequences of payoff outcomes
12. Another interesting number to note in figure 2 is f. Note that both temptation and
apprehension equal f when both trust and the time horizon assume the value of 1/f. This
implies that, when trust assumes the value of 1/f, the time horizon must be below 1/f for
temptation to outweigh apprehension. Further, when trust assumes the value of 1/f, the time
horizon must be below 1/2f for strong-form temptation to prevail. Note that temptation is
equal to 2f + 1 and apprehension is 2f when trust takes on the value of 1/f and the time
horizon is 1/2f. The term f, commonly referred to as golden mean or golden ratio, is of
historical importance in architecture, mathematics, and arts (e.g., Huntley 1970; Cook 1978).
The value of f is useful in numerical and mechanical as well as financial market analyses.
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Proposition 2. Trust greater than 0.5 is necessary but not sufficient
for the predominance of weak-form apprehension, weak-form tempta-
tion, or strong-form temptation.
Proposition 3. A time horizon less than 0.5 is necessary but not
sufficient for the predominance of strong-form temptation.
Before moving on to the managerial implications, we compare our
model with a different approach that allows for a dynamic modeling of
trust in the literature of fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine 1998). In
fictitious play, parties put full weight on the belief that the true value of
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trust corresponds to the relative frequency observed in past play. More
formally, the probability that the opponent will choose cooperation in
fictitious play is manifested in the posterior beliefs formed by taking a
weighted average of the empirical distribution at the end of the previous
period and the prior beliefs.
Fudenberg and Levine (1995) proposed a stochastic fictitious play in
which parties choose an action with a probability that corresponds to the
relative average payoff this action produced previously. They show that
universal consistency13 can be achieved by a smooth fictitious play
procedure in which actions are played in proportion to their utility with
exponential weights. The proposed stochastic fictitious play applies in
situations in which players observe only the received payoffs, not the
opponent’s choices.
This approach is similar to the current model in that it integrates the
payoffs with the party’s expectations about the partner’s behavior.
While fictitious play seeks to establish a best response by mapping ob-
servations to actions, the current model simulates the internal thought
processes of the decision maker by way of a thought experiment that
takes a certain level of trust as given, plays out possible scenarios in the
future, then reverts payoffs back to the present through discounting.
This thought experiment addresses the possibilities of misperception,
disguised cooperation, trust manipulation, trust abuse, andmistakes that
cannot be observed from the overt behavior.
For firms contemplating the structuring of cooperative incentives, a
variety of strategies are available. For example, incentives can be cre-
ated by way of price premiums that generate high joint gains for the
other party. By creating a future revenue stream of sufficient value,
price premiums entail profits that exceed the short-term opportunistic
payoff. Dutta, Bergen, and John (1994) demonstrate howmanufacturers
can pay their resellers price premiums as an incentive to comply with
assigned territorial restrictions. Alternatively, creating difficulties in
replacing the incumbent exchange partner can also generate cooperative
incentive. Wathne and Heide (2000) discuss how Taco Bell franchisees
continue to work with the franchisor despite strong opposition to the
newly introduced retail format (Taco Bell Express). Because of their
investment in specific capital, the franchisees are locked in with Taco
Bell as their next best opportunity is less attractive than continuing to
run a Taco Bell franchise.
Strategically, is the creation of a lock-in situation or the payment of a
price premium more effective in fostering cooperation? Our research
13. Such a universal consistent rule is both consistent and safe (Fudenberg and Levine
1995). By being consistent, behavior rules should do at least as well as playing the best
response to the empirical average of play if the opponent’s play is given by independent draws
from a fixed distribution. By being safe, behavior rules guarantee the player at least his or her
minmax payoff.
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suggests that it may well depend on the state of the relational context.
Specifically, the payment of price premiums are more effective when the
other party’s temptation is greater than apprehension and vice versa.14
While enlarging joint gains and creating switching barriers are impor-
tant strategies to promote cooperation, our research calls for attention
to other strategies aimed at containing losses from being cheated and
limiting opportunistic gains. It is noteworthy that containing losses from
being cheated becomes more important than enlarging joint gains when
the relational context is characterized as strong-form apprehension.15 Fur-
thermore, limiting opportunistic gains is more important than the creation
of a lock-in situation in case of strong-form temptation.16 The effective-
ness of alternative cooperative strategies available to the decision maker
under different relational contexts is summarized in table 2.
III. Conclusion
The question we set out to ask was this: Which payoff outcome has the
strongest effect in motivating cooperation? Our research suggests that
the answer critically depends on the relational context jointly formed by
the interpersonal and intertemporal dynamics in which the payoff struc-
ture is embedded. While the impact of each dimension on cooperation
has been extensively studied across disciplines, their joint impact has
received much less attention. This is unfortunate because each alone
captures only part of the picture of an ‘‘ongoing social relationship.’’
TABLE 2 Effectiveness of Cooperative Strategies under Alternative
Relational Contexts
SA WA WT ST
Creating a lock-in situation 1 1 2 3
Limiting losses from being cheated 2 3 4 4
Enlarging joint gains 3 2 1 1
Containing opportunistic gains 4 4 3 2
Note.—One is the most effective and four the least effective in each column.
SA = Strong-form apprehension
WA = Weak-form apprehension
WT = Weak-form temptation
ST = Strong-form temptation
14. Both paying a price premium and creating a lock-in situation can render a relationship
more worthwhile, because both an increase in the reward payoff and a decrease in the pun-
ishment payoff enlarge the benefit for the other party. They differ, however, in that the former
contains greed while the latter lessens fear.
15. As our contingency framework indicates, an increase in the sucker payoff is more im-
portant than in reward payoff only in the case of strong-form apprehension.
16. As our contingency framework indicates, a reduction in the temptation payoff is
more important than a reduction in the punishment payoff only in the case of strong-form
temptation.
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The four ranking sequences of payoff weightings derived from pair
comparisons with respect to four distinct relational contexts are mutu-
ally exclusive and collectively exhaustive. These relational contexts
portray the decision maker’s disposition toward the exploitation of
short-term gains relative to the concern over being cheated. As trust
increases and the time horizon decreases, this relativity evolves from
strong-form apprehension to weak-form apprehension then weak-form
temptation to strong-form temptation, each corresponding to a partic-
ular rank of the weightings of payoff outcomes.
Our research has important implications for voluntary cooperative
relationships across inter- and intraorganizational settings. While much
of the literature emphasizes the importance of cultivating interpersonal
ties and establishing a long-term view to foster a relationship, this paper
identifies strategies that are most effective in altering incentives to pro-
mote cooperation given the interpersonal and intertemporal dynamics.
The key theoretical insight is that the effectiveness of strategies that al-
ter payoff outcomes must be gauged against the context of a relation-
ship. Changes in payoff outcomes could contribute to an improvement
or deterioration of the structural viability of cooperative relationships.
As such, the contingency framework presented in this paper can be use-
ful in enhancing the decision-making capabilities of managers who either
proactively seek to improve cooperative relationships or reactively try to
mitigate unfavorable payoff changes. After all, a robust relationship can be
sustained only if the impact of each payoff outcome on cooperation is
properly comprehended and administered.
This model offers a framework of decision making with social and
temporal embeddedness explicitly considered. It derives the incentive
structure based on the premise of maintaining trust in its pure state, that
is, no trust violations. It, however, does not address many other strat-
egies, such as occasional cheating without retaliation given the indefi-
nitely large strategy space over supergame mixed strategies (Fudenberg
and Maskin 1986). To allow for these various strategies, the extent to
which one’s tolerance of trust violations must be taken into account. The
model also assumes away the possibility of sequential play and the
effects of reputation on the payoffs that can be earned in play with others
in the same network. A multiparty model is needed to take into account
the impact of reputation on other parties. Moreover, the model does not
discern whether party B reciprocates or cooperates. A more-refined dif-
ferentiation of motivations behind cooperation and noncooperation is of
interest to future research.
Another important area for future extension of this research is to take
into account the different utility functions associated with the greed,
fear, and benefit of a relationship. While this paper treats the utility
functions derived from these three parameters as the same, different
utility patterns could well exist from a behavioral point of view. For
573Managing Relational Bond
This content downloaded from 137.132.123.69 on Sun, 27 Sep 2015 21:27:55 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
#04463 UCP: BN article # 780206
example, it is plausible that the disutilities associated with the losses
from being cheated weigh more heavily than the utilities derived from
opportunistic gains or long-term benefits from cooperation. The incorpo-
ration of different utility patterns into the decision-making process en-
tails further research, which goes beyond the intended scope of this paper.
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